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The Referendum Law 2003 in
Taiwan: Not Yet the End of the
Affair
Joseph Lee
1 There is still lack of clarity, and some controversy, as to the reasons behind the passing
of the Taiwan Referendum Law 2003 (the Referendum Law). The Law was enacted with
the declared intention to enhance direct democracy. However, it has been argued that
there was also another agenda beyond mere improvement in the democratic system,
which is to provide a legitimate way for Taiwan independence. Whatever the intention
and purpose in passing the Referendum Law might have been, the author argues that
the Referendum Law still poses some legal problems and should be further clarified and
rectified. The problem arises because it is questionable whether the Referendum Law
contains sufficient safeguards against the possible exercise of arbitrary power on the
part of the Government. However, adequate safeguards are necessary in a system based
on the rule of law. In such a system, the extent of the Government’s power, and the way
in which it exercises such power, is limited and controlled by law and, above all, by the
Constitution1.  The Government in all  its  actions is  bound by fixed rules  announced
beforehand2.  There  should  be  clear  rules  and  procedures  for  making  laws.  The
independence of the judiciary has to be guaranteed to ensure that judges are free to
decide  cases  based  on the  law  and  not  in  response  to  any  external  pressure3.
Furthermore, the courts should have the power to review the way in which the above-
mentioned  concepts  are  implemented  to  ensure  that  they  are  being  operated  as
demanded by the rule of law. 
2 The Referendum Law provides for three types of referendum: the national referendum4,
the local referendum5, and the defence referendum6. First, the national referendum is a
referendum on new legislation, an initiative on new legal principles, an initiative on or
a ratification of major policies, and the ratification of constitutional amendments. The
most  controversial  question  relating  to  the  national  referendum  is  whether  the
referendum  can  and  should be  used  for  passing  constitutional  amendments  or  for
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adopting a new Taiwan Constitution7. Secondly, the local referendum is a referendum
on the  ratification of  local  regulations,  initiative  on principles  of  local  regulations,
initiative on or ratification of major local policies. Thirdly, the defence referendum is
to be called by the President if, and only if, the country faces an external threat that is
“likely” to cause change in her sovereign status8. Finally, there are limitations placed
on  the  use  of  the  referendum,  for  instance,  a  referendum  shall  not  be  called  for
budgetary  issues,  taxation,  governmental  investment,  remuneration,  and  official
appointments9.
3 In order to analyse what legal problems the Referendum Law poses in the existing legal
system  in  Taiwan,  this  article  will  identify  conflicts  and  tensions  between  the
Referendum Law and the Taiwan Constitution. The analysis will include the original
position of the Law under the Constitution and its position as a result of the subsequent
Constitutional  Amendment  of  June  10th  2005  (the  2005  Amendment).  The  2005
Amendment may have made the Referendum Law compliant with the Constitution ex
post. A further issue relates to the mechanism of legal control on the President’s power
to call a defence referendum. In addition, the analysis will include the discussion of the
High Court’s ruling in the case brought by Lien Chan and James Soong, the presidential
candidates for the blue-camp in 200410, to annul the election. These proceedings also
generated interesting issues as regards the Referendum Law, particularly in relation to
the calling of the defence referendum. Finally,  this article will  discuss whether any
steps should be taken to rectify the current legal anomalies. 
History of the Referendum Law 2003
4 The term referendum (gongtou) is not a completely new concept to the legal system in
Taiwan and has appeared in important constitutional rulings. In 2001, the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) Government decided to discontinue the construction of the
fourth  nuclear  power  plant.  The  Legislative  Yuan  commenced  constitutional
proceedings in the Constitutional Court11. In considering whether or not to adjudicate
the case, the Court said that “whether to build the nuclear power plant or not is a
political  question,  not a  legal  question.  Therefore,  it  is  not  within the remit  of  the
judiciary. The issue should be resolved through political negotiation or the procedures
laid down by the Constitution. (Abroad, they resorted to referenda). This should be the
proper way to resolve the issue. However, to meet the expectation of the Legislative
Yuan, the Executive Yuan, and the majority of the people in Taiwan, we hereby accept
to adjudicate the case”. If there had been a referendum law, the dispute could have
been  resolved  through  a  referendum  and  not  through  the  Court.  This  case also
indicates that a legal-political dispute over which the Court declines its jurisdiction
may  be  referred  for  a  referendum.  In  another  case,  the  Constitutional  Court,  in
expressing  a  view  on  a  constitutional  amendment,  compared  the  amendment
procedure  in  Taiwan  with  the  procedures  in  other  countries  and  regarded  the
“referendum”  (gongtou)  as  a  way  in  which  people  are  able  to  be  involved  in
“constitutional politics”12. This also further indicates that a referendum could be used
for ratifying a constitutional amendment. 
5 In 2003,  legislators from the DDP introduced the Referendum Bill  in the Legislative
Yuan. Initially, this was fiercely opposed by the KMT, the People’s First Party (PFP), and
other independent legislators. The opponents of the Bill advanced the legal argument
that if the Bill became law, it would be unconstitutional. The political argument was
that the Bill,  if it became law, would heighten the tensions in cross-Strait relations.
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Subsequently,  the  KMT  and  the  PFP  also  introduced  their  own  version  of  the
Referendum Bill13. Although the KMT and the PFP together through their majority in
the Legislative Yuan were able to outvote the DPP’s Referendum Bill, political pressure
required them not to oppose DPP’s  version of  the bill  totally  but to negotiate.  The
provisions in the original Bill, introduced by the DPP, for referenda on change of the
national frontiers, the national flag, and the official name of the country in addition to
the national, local, and defence referenda, were removed14. The quorum (or the turnout
threshold) originally envisaged in the Bill was increased. This was seen as victory by
the KMT and the PFP and as a defeat of the DPP. The Premier Yu Shyi-kun, as he then
was, in response to the enactment of the Referendum Law said that “this was a ‘bird-
cage referendum’ intended to confine the exercise of the people’s rights”.
6 The passing of the Referendum Law in 2003 occurred against the background of the
forthcoming presidential elections. By negotiating a watered-down version of the Bill,
the KMT and the PFP thought that the election agenda would no longer be dominated
by the referendum issue. However, and unexpectedly, President Chen Shui-bian called
a defence referendum under Article 17 of the Referendum Law. The call for a defence
referendum  astonished  the  blue  camp  presidential  candidates  as  well  as  the  US
Government. Needless to say, the news was also not expected by the People’s Republic
of China (PRC). Since then, the election agenda centred on the referendum. The blue
camp campaigned against the defence referendum and argued that the referendum was
moneywasting and dangerous to Taiwan’s security. It also increased tensions between
Washington and Taipei.
7 The Government of Taiwan argued that the referendum would affirm the status quo of
Strait relations. To this purpose, two carefully drafted questions were published. The
first was the following: “The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be
resolved  through  peaceful  means.  Should  mainland  China  refuse  to  withdraw  the
missiles it has aimed at Taiwan and openly to renounce the use of force against us,
would  you  agree  that  the  Government  should  acquire  more  advanced  anti-missile
weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities?”. 
8 The second question was the following: “Would you agree that our Government should
engage  in  negotiations  with  mainland China  on the  establishment  of  a  “peace  and
stability” framework for cross-Strait interactions in order to build consensus and for
the welfare of the peoples on both sides?”
9 The  two  questions  reflect  the  Government’s  intention  to  affirm  the  existing
understanding and expectations in the relationships with Washington and Beijing. The
calculation was that both questions would receive “yes” votes as it was thought that no
controversy existed as to the contents of the questions.
10 The  first  question  would  appear  to  be  in  the  interest  of  the  United  States  as  the
Taiwanese  Government  would  receive  backing  by  the  electorate  to  procure  more
advanced weapons from the United States. This question would simply have reaffirmed
the  current  arrangements  between United  States  and Taiwan based on the  Taiwan
Relations Act and the practice of many years15. In case of a “yes” vote, if the blue camp-
dominated Legislative Yuan had opposed Government’s military procurement from the
United States, this would have been seen as undemocratic. The United States could also
be thought likely to be in favour of a “yes” vote on the question as the United States has
been the biggest military provider to Taiwan16.
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11 The second question was drafted in a  way that  made it  difficult  for  China and the
United States to object to it.  This is  because the question sets no pre-condition for
opening dialogue with China but  only  refers  to  a  “peace  and stability”  framework,
which could potentially include the controversial “one China principle”.
12 The defence referendum was held on the Election Day and failed because the ballot did
not meet the 50% quorum17. 
The Legal Status of the Referendum Law 2003 under the Constitution of the R.O.C,
Taiwan 
13 The  Law  states  that  a  referendum  (gongtou)  may  be  called  for  the  purposes  of
ratification (fujue) of laws, initiative (chuangzhi) on legislative principles, initiative on
(chuangzhi)  or  ratification  (fujue)  of  major  policy,  and  ratification  (fujue)  of
constitutional amendments18.
14 The first question is whether the Law is constitutional. This problem must be analysed
by comparing the text of the Law and the Constitution. However, the problem is more
than a semantic one. There is no doubt that the primary objective of the Law is to
establish a legal mechanism to enable the people in Taiwan to repeal or introduce legal
provisions that cannot be repealed or introduced by the central or local governments.
A significant matter being that if the Law were to be held unconstitutional, the power
exercised by the President to call the defence referendum would subsequently also be
held unconstitutional or unlawful19. 
15 The reason for questioning the constitutional validity of the Law is two-fold: first, there
is  a  lack of  reference to the Constitution;  and secondly,  some provisions under the
Referendum Law conflict directly with certain provisions of the Constitution, especially
as regards the use of the referendum on constitutional amendments. It is crucial to
recognise the different concepts of “referendum” (fujue)20 under the Constitution, and
“referendum” (gongtou) under the ordinary Referendum Law 200321. The Constitution
does  provide  for  the  citizens’  right  of  referendum.  This  is  the  “constitutional
referendum”. Article 17 of the Constitution provides that “the people shall have the
right of election, recall, initiative (chuangzhi), and referendum (fujue)”. Furthermore,
Article 136 of the Constitution specifies that “the exercise of the rights of initiative and
referendum shall be prescribed by law”22. That is to say, that any ordinary law enacted
for the purpose of the exercise of the right of referendum must be subject to these
articles of the Constitution. It follows that any law providing for a referendum must be
based on these particular provisions rather than introducing a totally new right neither
prohibited nor protected by the Constitution. However, the Referendum Law does not
refer  to  Article  17  or  to  Article  136  of  the  Constitution.  The only  reference  to  the
Constitution is made in Article 1 of the Referendum Law, which states that the Law is
enacted based on the constitutional principle that sovereignty belongs to the people23.
It  may be  argued that  the  lack  of  any specific  reference to  specific  Articles  of  the
Constitution makes the Law less vulnerable to be challenged in the Constitutional Court
because it would fall to be assessed only against the general constitutional principles
rather than against specific constitutional provisions. This argument, however, would
appear to be weak. The better view is that, notwithstanding the lack of reference to the
relevant constitutional provisions, unless and until Article 17 and Article 136 of the
Constitution are abolished, the Law should be interpreted as enacted for the exercise of
the rights of initiative and referendum provided by these articles. On this analysis, the
Law does  fit  within  the  constitutional  framework as  it  is  enacted  to  give  effect  to
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articles  17  and  136.  However,  when  the  Referendum  Law  is  assessed  against  the
provisions of the Constitution in force at the time when the Law was passed, major
problems  arise.  The  referendum  (gongtou)  for  purpose  of  ratifying  (fujue)
constitutional amendments provided for by the Referendum Law would appear to have
been in direct conflict with the constitutional provisions that empowered the National
Assembly  to  have  the  final  say  (fujue)  regarding  any  constitutional  amendments.
Although the National Assembly at the time was not convened, it remained a political
institution that had the power to ratify amendments to the Constitution. During the
election campaign, the DDP promised to hold a referendum under the Referendum Law
to introduce a wholly new Constitution. This was proved to be inconceivable without
violating the Constitution, as was subsequently conceded by President Chen Shui-bian
in this inaugural speech on May 20th 200424. 
The legally binding effect of the referendum 
16 This section examines the legal effect of a referendum. The author argues that there is
lack  of  clarity  as  to  the  legal  effect  of  a  referendum.  Chapter  4,  Article  30  of  the
Referendum Law provides that the referendum question is regarded as approved, first,
if there is a greater than 50% turnout of the total number of registered voters and,
secondly, if the majority of actual voters cast “yes” votes25.  It is also stated that the
question of the referendum is deemed “rejected” if the turnout is less than 50% of the
total number of registered voters or the majority of voters casts “no” votes. The Law
makes no distinction between the failure of the referendum on the ground of quorum,
where the 50% quorum is not reached, and the rejection of the proposal of the question
when the quorum is  met but  the majority votes “no” to the question.  However,  in
principle, these two different outcomes should have different legal consequences. If the
referendum is binding and fails on the ground of quorum, the Government may take
the course of action envisaged in the question but is not bound to any particular course
of action. However, if the quorum is reached and there is a “no” vote to the question,
the Government must not take the course of action envisaged in the question. This is
the  case,  however,  only  if  the  referendum  is  binding.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the
Government, upon receiving a “no” vote on the issue, is still free to pursue the course
of action envisaged in the question, the referendum is then said to be consultative. The
Referendum Law is not clear on this point. The only legal consequence of the failure to
reach the quorum or to secure a majority of “yes” votes, is that the same question or
questions may not be raised within three years after the publication of the results of
the referendum by the Central  Election Commission26.  However,  if  the result  is  not
binding, there will be no legal consequences. The Government would still be free to
pursue the policy put to the electorate whether this is against or consistent with the
will of the people expressed in the referendum.
17 The question of the consultative or binding nature of the referendum is far from being
of legal interest only. It has important political implications. Following the outcome of
the defence referendum in March 2004, government officials in Taiwan clearly stated
that the result of the referendum was not binding on the Government. It can be argued
that the referendum only failed on the ground of lack of quorum but the policy was not
“rejected” by the people in the referendum. But the Referendum Law does not make a
distinction between a  “no” vote  and a  failure  to  reach the quorum. Therefore,  the
current position advocated by the Government seems to imply that the referendum is
not binding. If it were binding, the Government’s new proposal to procure weapons
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from the United States,  currently being contrasted by the opposition parties in the
Legislative Yuan, would be in breach of the Referendum Law. 
Referendum on constitutional amendments
18 Two aspects of the constitutionality of the Referendum Law need be analysed: before
and after the 2005 Constitutional Amendment. Let us start with the position before the
2005  Amendment.  As  explained  before,  the  Referendum  Law  is  not  clear  on  the
question of the legal effect of the referendum. However, it would appear that, at least
insofar as the referendum on constitutional amendments is concerned, at the time of
passing the Referendum Law and until the 2005 Amendment was passed, if the result of
the referendum under the Law was binding,  then some provisions in the Law were
unconstitutional. 
19 Under  the  Referendum  Law,  a  referendum  (fujue)  may  be  held  for  amending  the
Constitution, and such amendment may only be implemented in accordance with the
procedure  laid  down  in  the  Constitution27.  The  Constitution  provided  that  the
ratification  of  the  amendment  must  be  received  by  three-fourths  of  the  delegates
present at a meeting having a quorum of two-thirds of the entire National Assembly28.
Therefore, if, for instance, a referendum is held to ratify a constitutional amendment
such  as  the  abolition  of  the  Examination  Yuan  established  by  Article  83  of  the
Constitution,  and  the  referendum  receives  a  majority  of  “yes”  votes  with  a  50%
quorum, such an amendment proposal would still need to be submitted to the National
Assembly  for  its  ratification  in  order  to  take  legal  effect.  If  the  result  of  such
referendum is intended to have legally binding effect, and the National Assembly does
not  need  to  ratify  such  amendment,  the  referendum  will  be  considered
unconstitutional. 
20 This  likelihood  of  the  Referendum  Law  provisions  relating  to  the  referendum  on
constitutional amendments being declared unconstitutional has been removed by the
Amendment passed on June 10th 2005. The 2005 Amendment contains the following
provisions: 1) voters in late 2007 will use a new “single district, dual vote” system to
elect a Legislative Yuan that will be downsized to 113 seats from its current 225 seats; 2)
the tenure of the new Legislative Yuan will be increased from the current three years to
four years; 3) constitutional amendments shall be proposed by the Legislative Yuan but,
after the mandatory 180-day promulgation period, shall be presented for ratification by
all  Taiwan  eligible  voters  in  a  referendum;  4)  the  functional  or  ad  hoc  National
Assembly, which is the legal body responsible for revising the Constitution as stipulated
in amendments passed in May 2000, is abolished; 5) the Legislative Yuan has the power
to launch a recall of the President and Vice-President. Such a recall can be proposed by
one fourth of the legislators and must then be approved by two-thirds of the legislative
body. It is then to be submitted to a nationwide referendum for ratification or rejection
by majority vote; 6) the Legislative Yuan has the power to propose the impeachment of
the President or Vice-President, but such a motion would be reviewed by the Council of
Grand Justices and then adjudicated by a yet-to-be established Constitutional Court.
More particularly, Article 12 of the 2005 Amendment states that the Constitution can be
amended if: first, one-quarter of legislators proposes the amendment; second, three-
quarters of total legislators attend and three-quarters approve the amendment; and,
third, half of approved votes is for amendment. Finally, the amendment could then be
submitted to the people for ratification in accordance with the Referendum Law. It is
clear that the National Assembly will no longer have a role in ratifying constitutional
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amendments.  As  a  consequence,  the Referendum Law is  no longer  unconstitutional
after the 2005 Amendment.
The mechanisms of legal control on the President’s power to call an Article 17
referendum (defence referendum)
21 Many believed that the defence referendum held on the presidential Election Day was a
way to divert the election focus in the DDP’s favour. Nevertheless, any election strategy
is an inevitable element in a democratic election and should be accepted as long as it
complies with the law. 
22 The problems raised by the defence referendum are, first, the ambiguity of the wording
of Article 17, and secondly, the inadequacy of the legal restraints on the exercise of the
power to call a defence referendum29. Article 17 of the Referendum Law states that the
President may, upon the Executive Yuan’s resolution, call  a referendum and submit
questions regarding national security to the people, if, and only if, the country faces an
external threat that is “likely” to cause a change in its sovereign status. The purpose of
this provision, in political terms, is to respond, through democratic means, to a possible
military threat from China, for instance by deploying military vessels to the Taiwan
Strait,  increasing the deployment of missiles on the Strait  or taking any steps with
intent to paralyse Taiwan’s defence system. 
23 The question is whether Taiwan was facing an external threat that was likely to cause
change in its sovereign status when President Chen called the defence referendum. The
conditions imposed on the President’s power to call a referendum are that, first, there
must be a resolution of the Executive Yuan, second, there is an external threat to the
country, and finally, such a threat is likely to cause a change in the country’s sovereign
status.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  would  be  unlawful  for  the  President  to  call  a
referendum if  these  conditions  were  not  met.  Such an unlawful  act  should lead to
sanctions imposed on the President. The Referendum Law did not intend to give the
President an unfettered right to submit issues on national security to the people by way
of referendum.
24 A number of questions arise in relations to the calling of the defence referendum. The
first  question  is  whether  the  President  has  exercised  the  power  conferred  by  the
Referendum  Law  unreasonably.  The  second  question  is  whether  the  Law  provides
effective remedies to act as a legal restraint on the President if there is an abuse of the
power to call a defence referendum in a situation when the conditions laid down by the
law  are  not  fulfilled.  This  may  be  the  case  if,  for  instance,  the  President  calls  a
referendum even if he has no reasonable grounds to believe that there is any threat, or
likelihood of threat, to the national sovereign status. 
25 The Referendum Law does not specify who, in which court, and against whom, may
bring an action if the defence referendum is called without meeting the conditions laid
by Article 17. Procedurally speaking, no one would appear to have standing to bring
proceedings against the President if the referendum were called without the conditions
being fulfilled. This is because, under administrative law, a person wishing to challenge
the calling of the defence referendum under the Referendum Law would have to show
that  the  calling  of  the  referendum  affects  his  or  her  legal  rights  and  interests
recognised  by  the  law30.  Furthermore,  a  referendum called  by  the  President  under
Article 17 is  unlikely to cause a constitutional dispute arising out of the conflict  of
constitutional functions between central and local authorities31, which can give rise to
the local authorities’ standings to bring proceedings to resolve the dispute. 
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26 Even if the procedural hurdle of the legal standing can be overcome, the courts may
decline to rule on the question of whether the conditions specified by Article 17 have
been met if the courts consider that the question is a political one32, rendering the case
non-justiciable33. More particularly, if the Constitutional Court considers the question
to be a political one, no subsequent courts will be able to adjudicate the matter as to
whether the conditions have been met if a referendum is called under Article 17. On
this  analysis,  Article  17  would  result  in  the  President’s  unfettered  power  to  call  a
referendum.
27 On the other hand, judicial constraint may be imposed if the law intends to give certain
administrative  discretion to  the President  to  consider  whether  the conditions  have
been met. That is to say, that the President may call a defence referendum if, in his
opinion,  the  country  faces  an external  threat  that  is  likely  to  cause  change in  the
sovereign  status.  In  this  regard,  the  courts  will  have  the  power  to  scrutinise  the
President’s decision to call  a referendum by examining whether the opinion by the
President could have reasonably been formed.  Even if  this  is  the case,  the court  is
unlikely to question the detail of the decision and to scrutinise evidence in relation to
the relevant facts. The question will not be whether the President misled the public or
whether the President had the power to call a defence referendum. The judicial inquiry
will not be whether the situation considered by the President poses a threat to Taiwan
but whether the President has reasonable grounds to form the opinion that Taiwan’s
sovereign status is likely to be changed by the military, diplomatic, economic, or other
kind of threat under consideration. Under this test, however, the President will have a
rather wide room for manoeuvre. It is because “threat” is not necessarily confined to
military action but may include non-military threats, for instance diplomatic efforts
limiting Taiwan’s international activities and likely to have a negative impact on its
sovereign status. One example  in  this  regard might  be  China’s  relentless  efforts  to
persuade countries not to establish or to sever existing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. To
take this even further, it may be subjectively reasonable for anyone to form an opinion
(academic or personal) that China’s economic rise could pose an economic threat to
Taiwan. China’s economic boom may have a destabilising effect on Taiwan’s securities
markets and pose a threat to the country’s sovereign status. More realistically, it could
be argued that  circumstances such as  the passing of  the Anti-Secession law by the
Chinese People’s Congress in 2005 with a provision authorising the deployment of non-
peaceful  means  and  other  necessary  measures  to  protect  China’s  sovereignty  and
territorial integrity34, may justify a defence referendum being called. There are several
national security issues that could potentially be submitted for referendum, such as
those relating to the export of agricultural products to China and the “three (direct)
links” with China. The Law does not seem to delineate rigid boundaries within which
such power to call a defence referendum may be exercised. 
28 In conclusion, it would appear that the judicial restraint to the President’s power to call
a referendum is, at best, weak. As a consequence, the only checks and balances in the
system will be to resort to impeachment proceedings or to the recall provided for by
the Constitution35.  However,  impeachment proceedings,  which can produce political
uncertainty,  are  surely  means  of  last  resort  for  any political  party  to  hold  the
Government accountable. 
Case study
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29 The  importance  of  the  issue  of  the  legality  of  the  defence  referendum  and  of  the
effectiveness of judicial control over the power of the President to call it are illustrated
by  the  court  proceedings  brought  by  Lien  Chan  and  James  Soong,  the  blue  camp
presidential candidates, after the election held on March 20th 2004, to have the result
of the election set aside36. The argument advanced by Lien Chan and James Soong was
that the defence referendum was illegally held and that it had the effect of distorting
the fairness of the election process. The defence referendum should not have been held
together with the presidential election. The case reached the Supreme Court, which
dismissed it. The argument of the applicants failed on the grounds that, even if the
referendum  were  illegal,  there  was  no  proof  of  a  causal  link  between  the  alleged
illegality and the results of the election. This case shows that the exercise of the power
to call a referendum may be a contentious matter. This reinforces the conclusion that
more clarity is needed as regards both the nature and the extent of the presidential
power and the judicial control over its exercise. 
30 After the election, not only have the people forgotten about their democratic right to
vote in a referendum but, more importantly, the political parties have been busy with
other matters.  With the newly elected chairman of the KMT, and the consequential
structural changes in the party37, it seems that the Referendum Law will no longer be
the centre of political rows. The new KMT chairman may not wish to stick to old issues,
somehow limiting the party’s development of new policy initiatives. He may prefer to
move away from the disputes stemming from the 2004 presidential election and focus
on the 2008 presidential election in which many believe he will stand as presidential
candidate38.  Party supporters now hoping for a 2008 election win are less concerned
about the issue of the legality and legitimacy of the referendum. This will remain the
case, on both sides of the political spectrum, until it is stirred up once again by other
political parties. For the DPP, there are more important issues than looking back at the
legality of the Referendum Law. In the lawsuit brought by the blue camp presidential
candidates to annul the March 20th 2004 presidential elections, the Supreme Court of
Taiwan upheld the results of the elections, despite some reservations over the legality
of the defence referendum39. The DPP is uninterested in reopening this debate. 
31 Although the political landscape has changed and moved away from the debate about
the Referendum Law, this article has shown that legal problems40 arising out of the
Referendum Law existed and exist. The Legislative Yuan should take further measures
to revise  the 2003 Referendum Law.  First,  the Law must  clearly  state  whether it  is
enacted for the purpose of exercising the rights of initiative and referendum conferred
by the Constitution41. Secondly, a distinction must be drawn between the failure of the
referendum on the ground of quorum and the rejection of the proposal by a majority of
“no”  votes42.  Thirdly,  the  Law  should  clearly  state,  for  each  type  of  referendum,
whether the result will have legally binding force, especially as regards the referendum
held for the purpose of Constitutional amendment43.  Fourth, the Law should specify
who,  in  which  court,  and  against  whom,  can bring  proceedings  in  respect  of  a
referendum under Article 17 if the specified conditions have not been met44. In this
way, the exercise of this important instrument of democracy will be brought in line
with the principle of  the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of  law that it
embodies. 
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For the second question, there were 7,444,148 votes cast (45.10% of registered votes),
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29. The Referendum Law, art. 17.
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means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial
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National People’s Congress. 
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40. There, are, of course, a number of political problems. For instance, some suggest
that the quorum of a 50% turnout was set too high to achieve any successful result.
However, the quorum issue is a political question not a legal one. This article and its
conclusions focus on the legal problems. 
41. The Constitution of the ROC, art. 17; The Referendum Law, arts. 1 and 2.
42. The Referendum Law 2003, art. 30.
43. The Referendum Law 2003, art. 2; Constitution of the ROC, arts. 174 and 175.
44. The Referendum Law 2003, art. 17. 
The Referendum Law 2003 in Taiwan: Not Yet the End of the Affair
China Perspectives, 65 | may - june 2006
11
RÉSUMÉS
This article argues that the Taiwan Referendum Law 2003 and the defence referendum held in
2004 raise a number of legal problems that deserve closer examination. It discusses the history of
the Referendum Law from both legal and political viewpoints and argues that a functional and
legitimate referendum must be carried out in compliance with the rule of law and the supremacy
of the Constitution. The author identifies four main areas of concern, taking into account the
Constitutional  Amendment  in  2005.  First,  the  Referendum  Law  contained  unconstitutional
provisions  that  were  not  challenged before  the  defence  referendum was  held.  Secondly,  the
Referendum Law should have expressly relied on the Constitution as its legal basis. Thirdly, the
Referendum Law does not clearly determine the legal effects of the referendum. Fourthly, it does
not contain adequate legal restraints on the President’s power to call  a defence referendum.
These  legal  issues  have  been  raised  in  politically  oriented  cases  in  the  courts.  This  article,
however,  concludes  that  the  initiative  to  rectify  the legal  problems  of  the  Referendum Law
should lie with the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan.
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